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A project to enable health care professionals (GPs, 
practice nurses and diabetes nurse specialists) to access, 
via the Internet, confidential patient data held on a 
secondary care (hospital) diabetes information system, 
has been implemented. We describe the application that 
we chose to distribute (a diabetes register); the security 
mechanisms we used to protect the data (a public key 
infrastructure with strong encryption and digitally signed 
messages, plus a firewall); the reasons for the 
implementation decisions we made; the validation testing 
that we performed and the results of the first set of user 
trials.  
From a user acceptance perspective, we conclude that 
perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use on their 
own, are insufficient to guarantee that a new application 
will be used extensively in its new environment. Other 
domain specific factors, such as the compatibility and 
integration of the new computing system with the old, the 
working practices of the clinicians, the costs of using the 
new system compared to the old, and the actual location 
of the computing equipment all need to be taken into 
account when establishing untried information technology 
in ‘real world’ settings. 
 
1. Introduction 
The effective management of chronic disease, such as 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease, are increasingly 
dependent upon information technology. Traditionally 
these information systems have been developed within 
secondary care (hospitals), and have only been accessible 
from within the home institution. Many dozens (if not 
hundreds) of these information systems exits at hospitals 
around the UK. Unfortunately the majority of care is 
provided by primary care (GP’s) and nurses, who do not 
have easy, real time access to the information recorded in 
these centralised hospital information systems. This can 0-7695-1435-9/02 $
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of investigations. 
The aim of this research was to develop a 
methodology to convert standalone, hospital based 
information systems, into highly secure distributed 
applications running on the Internet. This would enable 
geographically dispersed health care professionals to have 
access to the information held within the (previously 
centralised) information system. The main research 
question was therefore “Can we connect a highly 
confidential information system to remote users via a 
highly insecure network such as the Internet, without 
compromising the security or the usability of the system, 
and can the design be sufficiently general that it is easily 
applicable to other such systems?”. As we were 
converting a pre-existing information system into a 
distributed system, we were not primarily interested in 
answering questions about the system’s functionality, or 
its perceived usefulness, as these were taken for granted. 
Our aim was to see if we could make the distributed 
system almost as easy to use as the centralised system, 
when strong security was added to it. Since adding 
security to an object usually makes it more difficult to use 
(consider for example adding a lock to a window, or an 
alarm to a building, or an immobiliser to a car), we were 
interested in finding out how much impact the addition of 
strong security might have on the usability of the system, 
and how we might minimise this. 
After some discussions with the clinicians at our local 
hospital, Hope Hospital in Salford, Greater Manchester, 
they decided that their Diabetic Information System (DIS) 
would be a useful application from which to build and test 
our methodology. 
2. The centralised application 
Salford is a health care district in Greater Manchester, 
UK, with a population of 230,510 of whom 5395 are known 
to have diabetes. The DIS was introduced in January 1992, 
and holds details about all the known diabetes patients. 
The DIS is used by all primary care and hospital diabetes 17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 1
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[20] are updated and verified during the annual structured 
preventative care review. Briefly this contains 
information regarding their type of diabetes, how it is 
treated, the presence of any diabetes related complications 
and biochemical indicators used to assess metabolic 
control.  
The DIS is accessible directly via a built-in user 
interface, and very recently a SQL based fat client has 
been added to allow access via the hospital LAN. (The 
client is fat, as it performs authorisation decisions based 
on the user’s login identity. By comparison a thin client 
would let the database perform the authorisation 
function.) All clinicians are given a username/password 
pair for login to the application, and the username 
determines one’s privileges for accessing the data (i.e. 
hospital consultants and general practitioners can only 
access data relating to their own patients). As the hospital 
LAN is a trusted network, with no network connections to 
the outside world, no security is provided for the data 
whilst it is in transit between the client and server.  
Once a year, paper printouts of each patient are 
produced and posted to all local GPs who then call the 
patients in for an annual diabetes examination. The 
completed pro-formas are posted back to the hospital for 
manual entry into the DIS, a process that can take several 
weeks (or months) to complete and produces additional 
problems. Data are double entered, once onto the pro-
forma and once into the database, thus giving rise to 
potential transcription errors. If patients visit their GP 
before their annual check up, no up-to-date data is 
available. The pro-formas can, and do, get lost or 
misplaced, and the whole process is time consuming. 
3. Addressing the security and usability 
concerns 
The first half of the research question was “Can we 
connect a highly confidential database to remote users via 
a highly insecure network such as the Internet, without 
compromising the security or the usability of the 
system?” To make the application accessible over the 
Internet, without compromising the security or usability 
of the system, a number of security and usability issues 
need to be addressed. It is well-accepted that the Internet 
is a highly insecure public network [10][14], and that 
connecting an organisation’s network to the Internet can 
significantly increase the vulnerability of the 
organisation’s network [21]. Most importantly, therefore, 
we had to protect the confidentiality of patient data as it 
was transferred across the Internet, and ensure that the 
hospital network was not compromised by connecting it 
to the Internet. Further, we had to ensure that only 
appropriate health care professionals with a “need to 
know” could access the patient data, as clinicians have a  
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confidential [6].  
The security concerns were addressed in the following 
ways. It is well established that confidentiality of data in 
transit is best provided by symmetric encryption using a 
strong algorithm and large key size [18]. The strongest 
algorithms are those that have been exposed to public 
scrutiny for many years without flaws being found in 
them [19]. The DES algorithm and its variants (e.g. Triple 
DES) readily pass this test. The time that it takes to mount 
a brute force attack on enciphered data is directly 
proportional to the key size used to encipher the data. 
Whilst the time depends upon the hardware being used, 
nevertheless, it was estimated that a brute force attack on 
a key size of 128 bits, using multi-trillion dollar 
specialised hardware, would still take 1011 years in 1995 
[18]. We thus concluded that a key size of at least 128 bits 
would be sufficient to protect the confidentiality of the 
patient data, and so we chose to use the triple DES 
algorithm that has an effective key size of 168 bits. 
In order to ensure that a remote user is genuinely who 
they say they are, and thus has a “need to know”, strong 
authentication of the users is required. Strong 
authentication prevents unauthorised people from being 
able to access the patient data. Many different strong 
authentication mechanisms exist. We decided to use a 
public key infrastructure (PKI) [1][17], as this provides 
strong authentication via digital signatures, as well as 
strong encryption. Since recent European legislation [7] 
recognises certain types of electronic signatures are 
equivalent to hand written signatures, using a PKI can 
provide irrefutable proof of who is accessing the 
confidential data should we need it. We were already 
using an Entrust PKI (see http://www.entrust.com) for 
other research projects so it was natural to choose this for 
the DIS application, but if we had not had access to 
Entrust, there are a number of other commercial PKI 
vendors and CA service providers to choose from.  
Maintaining the privacy of the hospital LAN by 
keeping out undesirable users and only letting in bona-
fide users is a difficult task. The commonly accepted way 
of providing this functionality is to place a firewall [3][4] 
between the hospital LAN and the Internet. The 
Telecommunications Branch of the NHS Information 
Authority oversees the connection of hospital LANs to 
the Internet in the UK, and maintains strict guidelines for 
this. The hospital chose to use FireWall-1 from 
Checkpoint (see http://www.checkpoint.com) and their 
implementation and management of this firewall was 
approved by the NHA IA. 
Validation tests were devised to check the security and 
integrity of the implemented solution. Specifically we 
tested: if unauthenticated users could access the system, if 
authenticated users could access the system and retrieve 
unencrypted data (thereby compromising its security in 
transit), and if the received encrypted data was exactly the 17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 2
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integrity). 
Turning next to system usability. Ease of use 
comprises several factors such as initial time to learn to 
use the system, simplicity of everyday use, and adequate 
performance. Tom Gilb [9] suggests that usability 
comprises four factors: the demands made on a user’s 
human attributes such as intelligence, sight, dexterity etc., 
the time needed to learn to use the system, how 
productive the system is during normal operation, and 
how well the users like the system. We devised a series of 
validation tests and a questionnaire that would help us to 
quantitatively and qualitatively determine each of these 
aspects of usability. 
Whilst system usability was our primary concern, it is 
not the only factor affecting a systems success. IS 
research suggests that user/client acceptance, top 
management support, good communications, good 
technical staff and project managers, and client 
consultation comprise the critical success factors of IT 
projects [13][15][16][23]. We endeavoured to maximise 
these factors so that they did not unduly impact upon the 
usability. Specifically, we were ensured top management 
support as the hospital consultants in charge of the DIS, 
and the GPs who owned their own practices, willingly 
joined the project. We had good technical staff and 
project management within our research team. We had 
regular project meetings with the clinicians and the 
technical staff. User acceptance, according to the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [5] is determined 
by “perceived ease of use” and “perceived usefulness of 
the application”, the latter being the more important factor 
of the two. This was found to be especially so for 
physicians using telemedicine applications [11]. As our 
clinicians had already suggested that the DIS application 
was the most useful one for us to distribute to the GPs, we 
assumed that the application had the required level of 
perceived usefulness. Our task therefore was to maximise 
the ease of use of the distributed DIS so as to maximise 
the client acceptance.  
4. Optimising the design of the application 
We had the choice between building a special purpose 
user friendly interface, or using an existing well known 
user friendly interface such as a Web browser. A special 
purpose interface gives the most flexibility in terms of 
design and capability, but at the cost of significant 
development effort plus time invested by the user to learn 
how to use the new application. The World Wide Web on 
the other hand is ubiquitous, and most (if not all) 
computer users already know how to use one of the 
popular browsers. We recognised that health care 
professionals are extremely busy with very limited time to 
spend on learning new applications, so we felt that Web 
browsers would give us the most chance of success with  
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use Web browsers, and if not, it should not take much 
time to teach them. Furthermore, as Web clients are 
available for all the computers most likely to be used by 
primary carers, we would have no portability issues. 
Finally, in order to maximise acceptance of the interface 
by the primary carers, we chose to design the main web 
page to look like the paper form that the clinicians were 
already used to seeing. This should minimise the demands 
made on their intelligence and on their time to learn to use 
the electronic system, and should maximise their 
productivity and contribute to them liking the system. 
Given the decision to use a Web based interface, a 
number of other decisions flowed from it. Firstly, we had 
to decide how to convert the http requests once they 
arrived at the web server, into SQL requests for access to 
the DIS. Secondly, we had to decide between using the 
SSL protocol [8] and its X.509 certificates [12], or Entrust 
formatted X.509 certificates and their proprietary 
protocol. We decided to use CGI scripts to solve the 
former problem, as they are an already proven way of 
converting web traffic into application specific queries. 
The latter decision was somewhat more difficult to make. 
SSL has a number of benefits, namely: it is a de-facto 
standard, all web servers and clients support it, and all 
PKI vendors and service providers can issue certificates 
in this format. However, SSL as implemented in 1998, 
had a number of severe disadvantages: 
- we only had immediate access to 40 bit encryption, 
which was inadequate for confidential patient data 
[18]. We managed to get a plugin to Netscape 
Communicator for 128 bit encryption (from Fortify 
see http://www.fortify.net), but not for Microsoft 
Internet Explorer as this would require a US export 
licence. (Note that Internet Explorer 5.5 includes 128 
bit encryption, but this only became available in 
2000). 
- SSL browsers and servers did not support the 
automatic retrieval of certificate revocation lists 
(CRLs), and this is an important factor to consider, 
especially from the server side. 
- Trust management has to be performed by the users of 
the browsers and the administrator of the web server. 
By this we mean that deciding which root CA public 
keys to trust and which not to trust has to be 
performed by the users. As these people are typically 
not security specialists (and additionally in the case of 
GPs they simply don’t have time to do this) we 
thought that this placed too much burden on them. It is 
a role that should be carried out by the security 
officers of the organisations. 
- Certificate renewal after expiry is a manual process, 
and some browsers will still continue to use expired 
certificates. 
Entrust Direct on the other hand, acts as proxies for 
both web clients and servers. Http requests from standard $17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 3
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proxy running in the user’s machine, strongly encrypted 
and digitally signed using the user’s private key, before 
being sent to the web server. The Entrust Direct server 
proxy, running in the hospital firewall intercepts the 
traffic for the web server, decrypts it, verifies the 
signature, and, if the user is trusted, forwards the http 
request to the web server. Both the Entrust Direct client 
and server automatically retrieve CRLs and process them, 
they will not accept expired certificates. They also have 
automatic mechanisms for certificate renewal (without 
user involvement) and they have all their trust decisions 
made for them by the security administrator of the PKI. 
Whilst a Canadian export permit was required for using 
128 bit or stronger encryption, this was merely a 
formality as Entrust had already been granted blanket 
approval for the UK. (Since 1998 of course, the export 
situation has changed somewhat, in that the US has now 
altered its approach and has granted blanket approval for 
128 bit encryption to be exported to commercial 
organisations in approximately 45 countries.) Given the 
above advantages of Entrust Direct, especially with the 
security naïve set of busy users that we had, it became the 
natural choice for us. The chosen architecture is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The Chosen Architecture 
5. Implementation 
In order to operate a PKI, a number of components are 
needed. The Certification Authority (CA) is the central 
server that responds to certification requests from the 
user, and signs the certificates of the users. It also issues 
the revocation lists. The CA will not issue new 
certificates or add certificates to revocation lists without 
being asked to do so by an authorised party. Usually a 
signed message from a trusted Registration Authority 
(RA) is sufficient for this. The Registration Authority 
Agent (RAA) is the administrative client used by a RA to 
issue signed certification or revocation requests to the 
CA. In the case of Entrust, after receiving a valid 
certification request from the RA, the CA returns secret 
authorisation information to the RA, which the RA gives 
to the user after authenticating him/her. The user’s Client 
uses the secret information to establish an authenticated 
encrypted link with the CA, and then sends a certification 
request to the CA. The possession of this secret  
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been authenticated by the RA, and the CA is therefore 
willing to issue the user certificate. All of the above are 
provided by Entrust as part of their basic PKI product 
line. All communications between the CA server and the 
other PKI entities are secured, but as a further precaution, 
we placed a Linux IPFWADM firewall between our CA 
server and the Internet, in order to block any improper 
traffic from untrusted third parties.  
One additional component needed by a PKI is a 
directory service in which to publish the certificates and 
CRLs that have been issued by the CA. LDAP [22] is the 
Internet standard protocol for accessing directory 
services, and this protocol is used by the CA server to 
write to the directory, and by clients to retrieve 
certificates and CRLs from it. We used the directory 
server from MessagingDirect (see 
http://www.messagingdirect.com) to publish our 
certificates and CRLs. 
The final components of our PKI are the Entrust 
Direct proxies that intercept the http traffic between the 
clinicians and the DIS. As stated previously, they interact 
with the PKI to fetch CRLs and check the signatures of 
incoming messages. They also digitally sign all outgoing 
messages. In the case of the client proxy it uses the 
private key of the clinician; in the case of the server proxy 
it uses the private key allocated to the DIS. The mode of 
operation is that the clinician starts the Entrust Direct 
client proxy instead of his usual browser, enters his 
password to gain access to his private key, and then the 
proxy starts up the browser. The user then interacts with 
the Web browser in the normal way, with no visible 
further interference from the client proxy. At the server 
end, the administrator of the firewall must enter the 
password protecting the DIS’s private key every time the 
server proxy is started. Thus every interaction with the 
DIS is digitally signed and may be audited if required. 
Whilst the PKI provides the strong authentication 
function, our CGI scripts needed to provide the 
authorisation function. The privileges must be 
administered in exactly the same way as the SQL fat 
client that they replace. The SQL client administered 
privileges by holding a table in the DIS containing the 
username, password and permissions of each registered 
user. The SQL client had super-user privileges to the DIS, 
and when a user logged in, it would compare the 
password with that stored in the DIS, and if correct, 
would retrieve the appropriate permissions for the user 
and act accordingly. We built the same functionality into 
our CGI scripts, but with an added enhancement. The first 
time a user accessed the DIS, he had to provide his DIS 
username and password. The CGI script checked that 
these were correct, and then stored the LDAP 
distinguished name of the user (obtained from the digital 
signature) in a new field in the DIS’s table. On 
subsequent login attempts, the CGI script could simply 17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 4
Proceedings of the 35th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2002
Proceedings 
0-7695-1435-retrieve the clinician’s registered username by looking up 
the one equivalent to the LDAP DN in the table.  
The biggest problem we had to overcome was how to 
store the DIS super-user name and password securely. As 
each CGI script needs access to these, we could not 
expect the firewall administrator to have to type them in 
each time. Therefore we had to rely on obscurity rather 
than security, and hide the username and password 
somewhere where the scripts could find them (details 
withheld for obvious reasons!). A future enhancement is 
to build a Session Manager that is a permanently running 
service that sits between the CGI scripts and the DIS. This 
will have to have the super-user name and password 
entered at start up time by the firewall administrator. The 
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Figure 2 The System Components 
6. Validation Testing 
Once the system was built, members of the project 
team and closely associated colleagues in the university 
and hospital (7 testers in all) performed a series of 
validation tests on the system. These were carried out 
prior to the implementation with the GP pilot users, as we 
wanted to be sure that the system was user friendly, 
reliable, and fast enough in performance before we gave it 
to busy GPs in their working environment. These tests 
provided us with quantitative evidence of both the 
system’s usability and security. Each database access test 
lasted between twenty and thirty minutes, to simulate 
what a clinician in the field would probably do under 
normal clinical situations. The following areas were 
examined under timed conditions: 
• Logging onto the Application securely 
• Searching for a patient’s record and retrieving the 
details (4 times per testing session) 
• Updating one patient’s data with new information 
and retrieving it 
• Closing the Application down and logging off  
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security and performance comparison purposes) 
In addition we logged the availability of the 
underlying hardware, software and networking 
infrastructure throughout the testing period. We measured 
the network availability by issuing Pings at timed 
intervals to various stations on the university LAN, the 
university’s Internet gateway, University College London 
(a well known reliable site on the Internet), Demon 
Internet (to test LINX connectivity for dialup users), the 
hospital gateway, and the hospital’s LAN. We measured 
data integrity by asking the testers to Email a copy of 
their retrieved record to a researcher, who compared this 
bit-wise with a copy he had previously downloaded from 
the diabetic register. We checked that the encryption was 
there by placing a line monitor on the connection between 
the user and the DIS. Finally we measured the time it took 
to install each user with the Entrust PKI. We revoked one 
user to see if this worked satisfactorily, and we reinstalled 
another user who pretended to forget his password to his 
private key. The complete set of tests and results are 
shown in Table 1. 
6.1. Test results 
We decided that 15 minutes was a reasonable time in 
which to install a new user with the client components of 
the Entrust PKI system. Out of the 8 users who 
volunteered to perform the tests, 1 was already installed 
prior to the testing, but we only managed to install 3 of 
the remaining 7 users within the allotted 15 minutes. 3 
more were successfully installed within 24 hours of 
starting the installation, but we could not install the final 
user due to her PC’s limited capabilities and the 
interactions with her Internet Service Provider (which 
limited outgoing TCP/IP connections). Clearly client 
installation is not as straightforward as it should be, even 
given that we were working in a very heterogeneous 
environment of PCs (different memories, CPUs, 
manufacturers, operating systems, configurations etc.)1.  
The 7 installed users completed 32 series of tests. This 
was less than we had planned, but never the less we felt it 
was sufficient to perform a meaningful analysis of the 
results. The overall success rate measures the percentage 
of attempted tests that were not completed successfully 
first time for one reason or another (e.g. unexpected 
result, network failure etc.). The purpose of this test was 
to attempt to estimate a “real-world” failure rate if this 
system had been rolled out to GPs in its current state. 
70% of the recorded failures were due to a design bug in 
the system. The record retrieved after update was not the
                                                        
1 A subsequent project with opticians, using a later version of Entrust, 
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User Testing 59 Tests allocated to testers 36 Tests Attempted 
4 tests were completely aborted 
32 Tests Completed 
31 Tests Completed and Considered 
Analysable 
Overall first-time success rate 99% 25% (FAIL) 
PKI Functionality   
User installation 99% success within 15 
minutes 
43% successfully completed within 
15 minutes 
57% within 30 minutes 
86% within 24 hours (FAIL) 
User revocation 100% success 100% (PASS) 




Unix workstation running 
X.500 directory 
99% availability 100% (PASS) 
NT4 PC running Entrust CA 
infrastructure 
99% availability 100% (PASS) 
Database server running 
diabetic register 




LDAP directory server 99% availability 100% (PASS) 
Entrust CA server 99% availability 100% (PASS) 
Entrust Direct Server Proxy 99% availability 66%  (FAIL) 
IIS server + Scripts 99% availability 100% (PASS) 
Network Uptime 99% availability 93%  (FAIL) 
System Security   
Unauthenticated access 100% failure 100% (PASS) 
Data Integrity 100% accurate 99% (PASS - see text) 
Non confidential retrieval 100% failure 100% (PASS) 
Ease of use and Performance   
Time spent to learn to use the 
system 
Less than 15 minutes Between 0 and 8 minutes (PASS) 
Time to launch the application 
after connection to the Internet 
has been opened 
Less than 60 seconds, or 
150% of the time taken to 
launch the insecure version 
Between 45 and 118 seconds. 
Compared to insecure access: 158% 
(FAIL) 
Time spent to initiate a request Less than 30 seconds 
Time for reply to be received Less than 1 minute 
Between 2 and 32 seconds (both 
operations combined). (PASS) 
Keying errors/mistakes in use <1% 0.02% (PASS) 
 
Table 1. The Validation Tests and Results 
 
correct one, because the code had been designed to simply 
search for the latest date and not the latest date and time. 
(In an operational environment retrieval on date alone 
might have been acceptable, as the clinicians had never 
expected a patient to visit them multiple times in one day. 
But during testing many updates were performed on the 
same record in one day.) This bug was fixed after the 
validation testing was completed. The remaining failures 
were due to the Entrust Direct server proxy being 
unavailable from 4pm onwards every day. We never did 
find out the true cause of this bug, but when we changed 
the CRL publication time from 4 hours to 24 hours it 
seemed to go away. 
The system proved to be very reliable throughout the 
testing period, with most components scoring 100% 
availability. Only the Entrust Direct server was 
temporarily unreliable, at 66% availability. Network 
availability, at 93%, was also poor, but unfortunately this 0-7695-1435-9/02 $17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 6
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entirely accounted for by failures in the university LAN, 
and not in the Internet. 
We were particularly encouraged by the time taken to 
learn to use the system (less than 8 minutes) plus the 
performance once the application was installed and the 
connection made to the database (between 2 and 32 
seconds to search for and retrieve a patient record). 
However, the time taken to launch the application and 
make the connection to the database (up to 2 minutes) was 
longer than we would have hoped for. Certainly we felt 
that this time would be prohibitive for a GP during a 
patient consultation, especially if the time to initiate an 
Internet connection had to be added onto this. 
Data integrity measured 99% and not 100% as 
expected. However, the 1% failure was found to be due to 
a documented bug in Windows NT. Of the 72 sets of 
results received from the testers, all were identical except 
for one where the dates were in American format rather 
than European format. A workaround has since been 
applied to the application. 
User revocation and user re-installation both worked 
correctly with no hickups. A revoked user was unable to 
access the system, as was an unauthenticated user (one 
without a trusted public key certificate). Furthermore, it 
was not possible for a genuine user to access the system 
without first being authenticated to it, or after 
authentication for the user to retrieve unencrypted 
information from the server. This was because the Entrust 
Direct server proxy rejected every request that was not 
digitally signed, and because the proxies intercepted every 
message between the user and the server and digitally 
signed and encrypted them all. 
Our overall conclusions from the validation testing 
were that the application was very secure, easy to use, and 
performed well after launching, but that application 
installation was problematical and application launching 
was too time consuming. 
7. User installation 
The results of the installation saw a repeat of the 
difficulties that we found during the validation testing, 
only this time the environments were even more 
heterogeneous, with a combination of different PCs, some 
connected by LANs and some stand alone, using a variety 
of different ISPs. Consequently we experienced an even 
greater number of unforeseen technical problems during 
installation. 
The original plan was to pilot the application with 12 
doctors and practice nurses located in 4 different 
surgeries. Surgery A is split over 2 physical locations and 
has 2 GPs and a practice nurse that work in both 
locations. Surgery B has 4 GPs and 2 practice nurses (but 
only 1 of the latter agreed to participate in the pilot).  
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has a diabetic specialist in a tertiary care unit. 
Surgery A had no suitable PC at either location, and 
so the project lent them a suitably configured PC and 
modem. This was placed in one of their locations on a 
worktop away from the GPs desks, and so was not readily 
accessible during consultations. Installation proved 
difficult due to the fact that their ISP, one of the numerous 
free ones in the UK, demanded to know the calling 
telephone number before giving them complete Internet 
access (i.e. access to all protocols and port numbers. We 
were using non-standard ports for our LDAP service, and 
Entrust uses non-standard protocols and ports). As most 
GPs in the UK are ex-directory, they usually withhold 
their telephone number from outgoing calls. We had to try 
10 different free ISPs before we found one that did not 
demand to know the calling number during login. 
Halfway through the trial our logging indicated that this 
surgery had not used the system once. When queried 
about this they admitted that they needed the PC to be on 
a mobile trolley rather than on a worktop, so that it could 
be moved to where the GPs were working. They would 
also like to have a printer available to them so that they 
could print out the patient’s details. These were provided 
for the second half of the trial. 
Surgery B has a LAN installed, with PCs on every 
GPs desk and a central server which automatically dials 
the Internet when needed. Though this dialup can take a 
minute to connect, it means that the Internet is always 
there when needed and no explicit action is needed on the 
part of the GPs. However, despite making several visits to 
the surgery, after one month we had only installed the 
software with 2 GPs and the practice nurse. The problems 
were all of a technical nature, but were compounded by 
the limited time available to the GPs. Therefore if the 
installation did not proceed as planned within the allotted 
time we usually had to book another appointment. 
Problems arose from the LAN configuration, and this 
made installation difficult. One of the GPs had 
volunteered to use a smart card to hold his private key, 
but after an hour of trying to install the card and reader he 
decided to use software based keys instead. (A report of 
some of the difficulties we experienced with smart cards 
is given in [2].) However, after installation our log files 
showed that they were using the system. 
In surgery C the GP uses the Internet frequently, and 
we were specifically asked not to alter any of his Internet 
settings. However, the GP was using an ISP provided 
dialer, rather than Windows Dial-Up Networking, and this 
forced the web browser to use that ISPs default proxy 
settings. These settings stopped Entrust/Direct from 
working. Fortunately the GP did have another ISP already 
installed, and so we had to instruct him to use that ISP, 
but even this caused him some disruption. The GP also 
agreed to pilot the use of a smart card, and this increased 17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 7
Proceedings of the 35th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2002
Proceedings of 
0-7695-1435-9/the installation time to 1.5 hours. However he had 
problems subsequently when using the smart card, and 
eventually reverted to using software based keys. 
Surgery D had no suitable PC, and so the project lent 
the specialist a laptop and a modem and set her up with an 
ISP. She was only able to dial the ISP from one of her 3 
consulting rooms as (a) the telephone connection in one 
room barred external calls starting with a zero and (b) the 
telephone connection in another room had a broken 
dialling tone which the modem did not recognise (we had 
to dial the “9” for an outside line manually to get a normal 
dialling tone!). However, once installed, this user used the 
application very frequently from the third consulting 
room (several times a day in fact). 
8. Analysis of users’ experiences with the 
pilot system 
At the end of a four-month trial period, users were 
contacted in person or by telephone, depending on their 
availability and underwent a short, highly structured 
interview based on a questionnaire. A total of 6 users 
were successfully interviewed, 4 doctors and 2 practice 
nurses. The interviews covered the following usability 
aspects: 
• Satisfaction with the existing paper-based system 
• Reasons for agreeing to join the trial 
• Installation issues 
• Interface design issues 
• Usage issues 
• Security issues 
• Impact of Security on Usability 
8.1. Satisfaction with the paper-based system 
Although the paper-based diabetes register was 
regarded as slow, frustrating, and time consuming to 
update, it is appreciated in that it provides general 
practices with relatively up to date information about their 
patients and in particular is valued as an audit tool by 
them. Practice nurses have been given the responsibility 
of providing Hope Hospital with updated database 
information. However, all those interviewed were keen to 
have access to an electronic version of the database as this 
was perceived as being quick, easy to use and as 
providing practices with real-time information about their 
patients. Perceived usefulness was therefore initially high. 
8.2. Reasons for agreeing to join the trial 
Users agreed to join the trial for a variety of reasons. 
These included: 
• To improve access to the database  
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• To gain access to network professionals with a view 
to gaining Internet experience / training 
• To help out colleagues 
• To gain insights into the long-term potential of 
Internet technology. 
During the trial period, as the database is constantly 
used for patient care both in primary and secondary care 
establishments, it was necessary to update the database 
both electronically and manually, using the paper format, 
until the reliability and robustness of the computerised 
version could be guaranteed. All users were aware of this 
at the outset of the trial, but were willing to continue as 
they could appreciate the long-term potential of such 
applications. 
8.3. Installation issues 
As already described installation procedures were not 
straightforward for the majority of users (4/6). For those 
four, this was a source of frustration, especially for the 
two doctors given smart cards, as neither of these worked 
easily. The actual problems encountered have already 
been described. However, once they were set up no one 
experienced any specific problems regarding password 
use and all thought the application itself was intuitively 
easy to use and understand.  
8.4. Interface design issues 
Everybody liked the actual interface design. As 
mentioned previously this was purposely designed to 
mimic the paper format of the database. Users appreciated 
this and it certainly enabled them to learn to use 
application almost immediately and to quickly familiarise 
themselves with it. There were no complaints about the 
actual locations of patient data. However, the fact that it 
was necessary to scroll down to gain access to all the data, 
caused some irritation and frustration to a couple of users. 
This was particularly the case for surgery D, where the 
user was supplied with a laptop with a very small screen. 
In her case, it contributed significantly to her dislike of 
the system. 
8.5. Usage issues 
After they had been installed, few users used the 
application routinely. This was due to a number of 
reasons: 
• The computer was in an inaccessible place, 
• Problems were experienced logging into the security 
software, where sometimes it took several attempts 
for users to gain access to the system 7.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 8
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accepted, 
• Problems were encountered with access to the 
Internet (lines being busy), 
• The application was not inherently useful, 
• Most people thought it made their job harder not 
easier, 
• Clinicians were still forced to use the paper system at 
the same time as the Internet version. 
One of the major problems with the pilot system as a 
whole was that it was duplicating work that had to be 
carried out anyway in a paper format. Unfortunately, we 
could not forego the paper system until the Internet 
version was proven to be robust. The pilot system was 
also an extra IT system that was not compatible with the 
GPs’ in-house patient care systems, and therefore, in 2 of 
the 3 practices, required a separate designated computer. 
Hence, nobody relied on the pilot system to provide them 
with up to date results, as they already had access to 
reasonably current results, either on their own in-house 
patient care systems or in a paper format from the 
hospital. Also the Internet version of the database was 
regarded as being too slow for routine use during clinic 
consultations with the patients present, since the mode of 
use was to login to the Internet as and when needed, 
rather than to leave the connection open all day.  
Another factor was the working practices of the GP’s. 
Most are used to looking through the patients paper notes 
for letters and results when consulting with patients and 
the computer would not supersede this activity, especially 
as it only provided the same information as the paper 
notes. Therefore, most people who actually used the pilot 
system did so at the end of clinics where they updated 
everyone’s record who had been seen that day. The only 
exception to this was the consultant ophthalmologist, who 
used the computer system with patients to obtain up to 
date information about her patients’ diabetes status and 
blood pressure, both of which impact upon the 
progression of diabetic retinopathy. She did not routinely 
have access to this information, so for her, the 
computerised database provided her with extra 
information and was therefore inherently useful. 
Although most users tried to use the system on more 
than one occasion, nobody used it routinely, and only 3 
people accessed it after month two of the trial. The main 
reason for this is that it takes too much effort to gain 
access to the system as ‘logging on’ procedures 
recurrently fail or are too slow. The consultant 
ophthalmologist also stopped using the system for the 
same reason, even though she had the most to gain from 
the system. Other usability factors include the fact that 
clinicians had to scroll down to ‘see’ all the relevant 
sections of the information sheet. This was not a problem 
for those with large computer screens, but was a major  
0-7695-1435-9/02 $1
 of the 35th  Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-3502) 
-9/02 $17.00 © 2002 IEEE factor for the consultant ophthalmologist as she only had 
a laptop with a small screen. 
Cost is also an important consideration for general 
practitioners, who have access to a free postal service to 
their local hospital (in this case Hope Hospital). Internet 
access requires them to pay the cost of a local telephone 
call, and if it is accessed for prolonged periods of time, 
this will have implications for their practice budget. 
Interestingly, all the doctors but neither of the nurses 
mentioned cost as a factor to be taken into consideration. 
This probably reflects the fact that doctors are responsible 
for practice budgets and not nurses. 
8.6. Security issues 
Users were aware that security software was being 
used, but had little idea how it worked or how efficacious 
it was. In fact, they placed their trust in the computing 
personnel who set them up as users, and relied on the 
latter telling them the truth. They mentioned that they had 
no means of checking the validity of the latter’s claims 
that the security software was bone-fide, but also that they 
were happy to place their trust in them. This is perhaps 
not as surprising as it may at first seem. When faced with 
decisions in a realm that is unfamiliar to us, most people 
will tend to ask for the advice of domain experts and will 
follow it. It would be unreasonable to expect doctors to 
utilise line monitors and software diagnostic tools to 
ensure that the data was being encrypted as it traversed 
the Internet, so trusting the computer experts is a rational 
alternative. After all, we routinely trust our health and our 
lives to our doctors, so trust is part of their working 
culture. 
On the whole, most doctors thought the information 
system was more trustworthy than the paper-based 
system, as gaining access to paper and envelopes was 
thought to be easier than gaining unauthorised access to 
the database.  
This raises a number of issues about the legal liability 
of doctors should breaches of the medical data occur. 
Since we did not prove our claims to the doctors, other 
than that the NHS Information Authority 
(Telecommunications Agency) had authorised us to use 
the system, if a problem had occurred, it is likely that the 
doctors would have had to bear some or most of the 
responsibility for this.  
The two nurses interviewed, however, were more 
sceptical than the doctors, and unsure as to the reliability 
of the security software. They placed more trust in the 
paper-based system. The reasons for this seemed to be 
multiple. Firstly nurses are not as computer literate as a 
lot of doctors and may not use the computer as much. 
They therefore may be more suspicious of computers per 
se. Secondly these nurses were much ‘closer’ to the 
database than the doctors, as they were directly 7.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 9
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also used its information much more actively in their 
patient care. Therefore, they were more aware of the 
database limitations and inaccuracies compared with 
doctors. Finally, they also experienced significant 
problems trying to access the system. This latter problem 
seems to have influenced the attitudes of both the nurses 
and some of the doctors as to the overall security of the 
system. Their logic was if there are so many problems 
gaining access to the system, there may be problems with 
the actual security of the system as well. Hence, the 
problems experienced with logging onto the system has 
reduced the users confidence in its other aspects such as 
its security. 
8.7. Impact of Security on Usability 
From the interviews with the users it was clear that the 
only evidence of added security was the use of their 
password to access their private key, and otherwise it was 
transparent to them. Once users had gained access to the 
system, no-one thought the security software was an 
imposition, as they did not realise it was there after they 
had successfully logged on. This fact is advantageous 
from a usability perspective, in that the security software 
does not impose a further burden on clinicians using the 
system, but it is disadvantageous from a security 
perspective, as they cannot tell whether the data is secure 
or not as they access the system. (In fact the software does 
display a turning key icon in the Windows system tray 
when it is encrypting and decrypting data, but most of the 
users were oblivious of this fact.) 
9. Limitations/Future Research 
A number of factors impeded our research. Firstly 
because the DIS was a pilot system, the existing paper 
based system had to be run in parallel with it, and this 
caused extra work for and resistance from the users. Also 
the availability of the paper print out tended to undermine 
the inherent usefulness of the electronic system to the 
doctors, and therefore provided a disincentive to use it. 
Finally because the Web access to the DIS was a separate 
application to the GPs existing electronic patient 
management system, it meant that any data retrieved from 
the hospital was not automatically incorporated into their 
existing system, and so remained isolated from it. All 
these factors conspired against the users making frequent 
use of the DIS, and coupled with the problems the users 
experienced in gaining access to the DIS, the costs clearly 
outweighed the benefits. 
The research was further limited in that only 12 
users took part, and only half of these were successfully 
interviewed at the end of the trials. This small sample  
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research would benefit from being repeated with different 
user groups, in different organisational contexts, 
particularly with those who do not currently receive paper 
output from the DIS, so that the electronic interface will 
be their only means of access to the diabetic information. 
Opticians, for example, are one such candidate group, and 
a follow on project is currently underway with them. 
Concerning the methodology of obtaining the user 
feedback, we relied solely upon structured interviews 
based upon a questionnaire. No direct observations by 
either a researcher or video camera took place, and this 
could have provided additional unbiased valuable user 
feedback. Thus the user’s experiences that we have 
captured are the ones verbally given to us after a time for 
reflection, and they may have been intentionally or 
unintentionally modified during this time. 
The scope of the research was purposely limited by 
its primary research question focussing on security and 
usability, and we did not address the wider issues of 
information systems success. Additional research 
questions could be posed concerning the success of the 
distributed system, for example: which organisational and 
contextual issues lead to success, how maintainable and 
modifiable is the chosen system, what is the commercial 
viability of system deployment and operation, how is the 
quality of the database affected by online updates as 
opposed to paper based ones, and what are the 
demographic and educational-related user acceptance 
criteria. 
Finally in order to demonstrate that the method 
described here is generically useful, it would be good to 
repeat the experiment with several other health care 
applications. 
10. Conclusions 
We have shown that it is possible to provide highly 
secure remote access to a hospital information system via 
the Internet, using commercial products and tailor made 
CGI scripts. By carefully designing the user interface 
around a Web browser, it is possible to build a system that 
is extremely easy to use by both doctors, specialists and 
practice nurses. The time to learn to use the system is 
minimal, and the high security does not impose any 
significant burdens on the users. The response time is also 
adequate, though would benefit from an improvement. 
However the time taken to launch the application is an 
inhibiting factor, especially when using dial-up access via 
an ISP. Initial user logon (application launching) thus 
proved to be the biggest problem to the users during 
normal operation. The largest problem we faced was 
installing the users as members of the public key 
infrastructure. Installation was plagued with unforeseen 
technical difficulties, and the smart cards proved so time 17.00 (c) 2002 IEEE 10
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users stopped using them during the trials.  
Despite the fact that the users experienced significant 
problems with the system during the pilot trial, none the 
less they valued the experience and could see the potential 
benefits of such a system, providing it can be made quick 
enough and robust enough, and integrated with their 
existing systems. Perceived usefulness therefore remained 
high. However, from a user acceptance perspective, other 
considerations such as the compatibility and integration of 
the new computing system with the old, the working 
practices of the clinicians, the costs of using the new 
system compared to the old, and the actual location of the 
computing equipment all need to borne in mind when 
establishing untried information technology in ‘real 
world’ settings. We conclude that perceived usefulness 
and perceived ease of use on their own, are insufficient to 
guarantee that a new application will be used extensively 
in its new environment. Other domain specific factors 
need to be taken into account. 
We further conclude that our method for securely 
distributing health care applications does ensure high 
security for the data whilst in transfer and does not 
significantly impede the usability of the application, 
although the installation and application launching steps 
still need significant improvement. 
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